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Abstract
Article 1, Section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall 
have the power… To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes”.  This short and simple statement has been progressively used, in 
combination with a few other powers both granted and assumed by various federal actors, to take 
greater and broader powers over the states and private citizenry.  The original judicial 
understanding of the so-called Commerce Clause (differentiated from original intent) comes from 
the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1. Through subsequent cases, the judicial 
understanding of the commerce clause is clarified. Then during the administration of Franklin 
Roosevelt, there seemed to be a change in attitude toward using an enumerated power to infringe 
on a police power, which is properly the role of the individual states. Through this new 
understanding of the power of the commerce clause, 20th century America sees unprecedented 
growth in federal regulation and criminalization on numerous fronts of civil society. This 
understanding continued until about 1995, when the Supreme Court struck down the Gun Free 
School Zones Act as unconstitutional. This began a shift in the way the Court saw the power of the 
commerce clause as elements of the federal government began to temper what they perceived their 
powers to be.
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The Constitution of the United States explicitly separates the powers of the federal 
government. Also, it explicitly enumerates the powers of the federal government, and those that are 
not enumerated within the Constitution are relegated to the states (see U.S. Constitution, Tenth 
Amendment). An example of this would be police powers. The federal government, according to 
the Constitution, only has police powers within the District of Columbia, federally owned property, 
“Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-yards, and other such needful buildings.” (Art. I, Sect. 8, Cl. 
17).  Yet, people are charged with federal crimes that did not occur in those locations frequently. 
From where does the federal government derive this authority? As George Terwilliger aptly points 
out, “Through much of our history, Congress’ use of this power was limited to affirmative acts 
designed to facilitate commerce: the construction and improvement of roads and other means of 
transportation, later the means of interstate communication and the widespread availability of 
power and energy.  A prime example of this was the enactment of legislation following the Civil 
War to enable the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad which facilitated the settlement of 
the West.” (2000, para. 11) (emphasis added). 
The Constitution only declares the federal government able to “punish as crimes, 
committed on state territory, only a limited number of subjects: (1) treason (Art. III Sec. 3 Cl. 2); 
(1) counterfeiting (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 6); (3) piracy or felonies on the high seas; (4) offenses against 
the "laws of nations" (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 10); or (5) violations of discipline by military or militia 
personnel (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 14)” (Roland, 2002, para. 11).  The federal government, to obtain more 
power and control than the Constitution provided for, has re-interpreted the Constitution 
accordingly, to increase its power and control over the states and individual freedom. It did this 
primarily through two methods; the first, through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the second, through the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
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The Commerce Clause, found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, 
empowers Congress “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes." It continues to authorize Congress “To make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers….” There are two areas of 
focus within this phrase that should be considered; the meanings of “regulate” and “commerce.”
The first case to deal with the Commerce clause was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
The ruling rejected a narrow reading of the Constitution as argued in the case by the State of New 
York.  Chief Justice Marshall wrote ''The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to 
buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends 
navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its 
significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more--it is intercourse.” 
“Intercourse” was qualified by the term “commercial” keeping it strictly related to monetary 
transactions (Findlaw.com, “Commerce Clause”).
There is some contention set forth, that the understanding of “regulate” in the Commerce 
Clause combined with “all laws necessary and proper” can not legitimately be interpreted as an 
outright ban on certain items. Banning by definition negates the understanding commerce. 
According to Jon Roland, originally, the Commerce Clause did not give 
…the power to prohibit, nor did it imply the power to impose criminal 
penalties for violations. While a "regulation" might be considered as the prohibition 
of some modalities of something, like packaging, labeling, handling, routing, or 
scheduling, it could not be prohibition of all modalities. There must always be some 
modalities that are permitted. The restriction must be reasonable, and must serve a 
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public purpose, and not favor one segment of the market over another (2002, para. 
7).
Commerce, as originally understood, does not apply broadly until Gibbons develops the 
initial judicial understanding, which is arguably broader than Roland suggests original popular 
understanding was. Commerce was related to industry, but they are not the same. Commerce 
according to County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1881) when  “…strictly considered, 
consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation and the transportation and 
transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.” The 
“strict understanding” in Kimball was the broad understanding in Gibbons.  There was no 
understanding of the commerce clause reaching into the realms of manufacturing and production, 
as illustrated by the Supreme Court in 1888;
If it be held that the term includes the regulation of all such manufactures as 
are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is 
impossible to deny that it would also include all productive industries that 
contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, 
to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only manufactures, 
but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining -- in 
short, every branch of human industry (Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1) (emphasis 
added).
The Court continues in Kidd to recognize the broad power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate, saying “All commodities are subject to a proper exercise of the 
police power of the States, and all commodities in their relation to inter-state and foreign 
commerce are subject to the paramount and exclusive authority of Congress.” This understanding 
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combined with the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), defining the 
“necessary and proper” clause not as a limitation, but as an enumerated power of Congress1 sets 
the stage for broad expansion of federal power under the Commerce Clause in the early and 
mid-1900s.
According to Bork & Troy (2002), referencing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876), “In 
short, ‘commerce’ does not seem to have been used during the founding era to refer to those acts 
that precede the act of trade. Interstate commerce seems to refer to interstate trade — that is, 
commerce is "intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all its forms, including the 
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the ... citizens of different 
States." The court maintains a more or less historic understanding of what commerce entails; it did 
not include production.
Again, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court ruled in that historic 
manner, holding that “Extraction of coal from the mine is the aim and the completed result of local 
activities. Commerce in the coal mines is not brought into being by force of these activities, but by 
negotiations, agreements, and circumstances entirely apart from production. Mining brings the 
subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it.” (Citations omitted). The 
Supreme Court rejects the notion that manufacture or production (mining coal) is commerce, but 
only in dealing for disposal of what has been produced.
In the late 1930s, after FDR’s threat to pack the judiciary, and the “switch in time that 
saved nine” had occurred, there was a marked difference in the direction of the court as it related to 
the New Deal (which it had previously struck down several parts of as unconstitutional) 
(Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia, “Commerce Clause”). The court became friendly to the idea that 
1 McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall states, “The clause is 
placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those powers.  Its terms purport to enlarge, not 
to diminish the powers vested in the government. In purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those 
already granted.” (Citations omitted). 
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the Commerce Clause be used for all sorts of policy making and regulation within industry, even if 
it precedes the actual negotiation or trade of formerly regulated items.
In 1937, the Kidd ruling was overturned in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1, by upholding the National Labor Relations Act if 1935.  The argument against the NLRB 
was basically that it took away property rights in the form of the right to manage one’s own 
business. The Court upheld the powers of the NLRB saying that the “…Act may be construed so as 
to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Board, 
and invoked in this instance, is found in § 10 (a), which provides: ‘The Board is empowered… to 
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting 
commerce.” This ruling also creates a new right; the right of employees to organize and bargain 
with their employer collectively. But, this watershed case “departed from the distinction between 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects on interstate commerce” (U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
Finally, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court reached its 
broadest interpretation of the power of the Commerce Clause. It ruled that a wheat farmer was not 
allowed to farm his annual acreage of wheat that year, but could only grow 11.1 acres. He planted 
11.9 acres over the allotted amount, totaling 23 acres planted. He was fined for the overage 
production and would not pay the fine amount. The court held that this was within the scope of the 
Commerce Clause as it affects the wheat market, “…marketing quotas not only embrace all that 
may be sold without penalty but also what may be consumed on the premises.” Essentially, the 
overage produced by Filburn to feed his cattle and poultry affected commerce in that he was not 
purchasing it from the market while a quota was in force. This affected interstate commerce 
according to the courts. This is an amazing stretch of power, the seeds of which had been laid 
down in the preceding 100 years of Supreme Court cases.
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Then in 1964, in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, known as the “Ollie’s Barbeque” 
case (Burke, 2001, para. 4), the Court stretched sensibility and finds that although the restaurant 
owned and operated by a private individual, McClung, unlawfully discriminated against blacks by 
refusing to serve in the restaurant even though they did allow carry-out for blacks. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was forcing McClung to serve blacks and he argued that it would affect his 
business negatively and wanted Title II of the Act struck down as unconstitutional. McClung 
operated an admittedly local restaurant that only catered to the local population. He purchased half 
of the meat for the restaurant locally, but the local distributor purchased it via interstate commerce. 
The Court held that this indirect connection to interstate commerce substantially affected 
commerce enough that the Act could rightly regulate, and force McClung to serve blacks in his 
restaurant in accordance with the Civil Rights Act. The Clause no longer was used to regulate 
goods in commerce, but to extend power to compel individual compliance with legislation, because 
of some miniscule connectivity to commerce (Burke, 2001, para. 4).
In 1995, U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, the Supreme Court finally stepped away from the 
broad understanding that had been promulgated and in the first lines of the Court’s opinion stated 
that,
In the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal 
offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the 
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." The Act 
neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the 
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. We hold that the Act 
exceeds the authority of Congress "to regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States . . .” (citations omitted).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist in delivering the opinion discusses the historical development of 
Commerce Clause power. Rehnquist notes three areas wherein the Court has deemed Congress 
possesses Commerce Clause powers;
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce…. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. … 
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce… (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).
The Court was strict specifically over its determination of what “substantially affect” 
means. They decided that it did not solely mean “affect” and stated “the Court has never declared 
that ‘Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general 
regulation of state or private activities’” (U.S. v. Lopez). In his dissent to the Lopez ruling, Justice 
Stevens clarifies his opinion that Congress should have this broad power because guns come into 
possession through commerce and are used after commerce, and hence Congressional regulation is 
justified;. 
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain 
commerce. Their possession is the consequence, either directly or indirectly, of 
commercial activity. In my judgment, Congress' power to regulate commerce in 
firearms includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because 
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of their potentially harmful use; it necessarily follows that Congress may also 
prohibit their possession in particular markets. The market for the possession of 
handguns by school-age children is, distressingly, substantial. Whether or not the 
national interest in eliminating that market would have justified federal legislation 
in 1789, it surely does today (citations omitted).
Although the Court restrained itself and Congressional power in Lopez, there is still a 
strong segment within the Court that would broaden those powers if possible. Justice Stevens was 
attempting to stretch the meaning of “commerce” to include regulation after commerce, just as 
arguments in Carter had attempted to do preceding commerce (regulation of manufacturing). 
Then again in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) the Court succeeded in limiting the 
powers of Congress by declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as beyond its 
authority to enact. 
In 1999, in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, the Court struck down a part of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) which allowed rape victims to sue their attackers in 
federal court (Kopel & Reynolds, 1999). The law was based largely on the Commerce Clause and 
the Court found that “Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.” Since all laws Congress enacts must be based on one of their powers, and 
VAWA in Brzonkala was largely argued under Congress’s ability to regulate commerce, based on 
Lopez and Boerne, the Supreme Court rightly struck it down.
The Constitution specifically attempts to restrain the powers of the federal government. 
Personal freedom, not solely societal order, was considered paramount; the founders in the 
instance of the Commerce Clause failed in their objective, by allowing their overarching goal to be 
subverted through a lack of clarity. This subversion took place slowly, as attitudes and perceived 
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political, economic, and social needs, evolved within American society. The expansion with 
regards to the Commerce Clause was coincident with the expansion of Due Process understanding; 
much of the problem being exacerbated by Roosevelt’s twelve year administration and 
appointment of nine Supreme Court Justices. More recently, the Court has ruled that the Congress 
is limited in its authority. These rulings are a fortunate victory for limited government proponents 
and for the historic understanding of the U.S. Constitution. With Chief Justice Rehnquist battling 
cancer and rumors of his stepping down before year’s end, and a non-cooperative mood in 
Congress with respect to judicial nominees, President Bush will have a difficult time keeping a 
conservative on the bench. To enable the Court to keep ruling in a quasi-constitutional manner, a 
Supreme Court nominee with strict constructionist view of the Constitution needs to pass muster 
with the Senate. It will be an interesting year.
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